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An Economic Assessment of the Military
Burden in the Middle East: 1960-1980
Fred M. Gottheil*
Whatever else may be said about the economics of national security,
few would disagree with the proposition that opportunity costs associated
with military expenditures are positive for any size expenditure and for
any nation. Nor would there be much argument with the proposition that
rich nations can more readily afford such expenditures than can poor
nations. A military-ladened pauper can "secure" itself into a state of
economic bankruptcy.
In the Middle East, the military sectors are the most rapidly expand-
ing, the most technically advanced, and enjoy the highest national priority.
It has become hardly an exaggeration to describe their civilian sectors
as decreasing residuals. The Arab-Israel war of 1967 and its aftermath
continue to be the dominant factor shaping the prospects for economic
development in the region. This state of affairs, as Table 1 indicates,
is a continuation, albeit it on a more accelerated scale, of the pre-war
1960s pattern of military expenditures.
The percentages in Table 1 would represent an overwhelming display
of military activity even were they not associated with countries of es-
pecially low per capita income and countries not especially endowed with
^Estimates for 1969 per capita income (US dollars) are for Egypt
$189, Syria $224, Iraq $311, and Jordan $314. The Military Balance
1970-71
, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1970, pp. 40-45.
Professor of Economics, University of Illinois in Urbana, and Visiting
Professor of Economics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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Table 1
Militnrv ExoeTiditures as a Percent of GNP in
I^JIiigl.:--JiS>IP-£-:--^^^'^' Jordan and Syria
(3.960-1969)
Israel Esypt Iraq Jordan Syria
8.4 18.1
8.1 14.7
8.0 14.6
9.9 14.9
10.9 13.1
12.2 11.7
10.5 12.2
10.3 12.8
9.8 13.5
10.0 18.0
1960-1965j Safran> Nadav, From War to War, Pegasus, New York,
1969, pp. 150, 159, 172,177, and 181; 1966-1969, The Miljtary
Balance 1970-1971 , The Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, 1970, pp.~ 110-11.
1960 8.6 6.0
1961 8.2 7.0
1962 8.8 7.1
1963 9.5 8.5
1964 10.7 11.0
1965 11.5 12.2
1966 12.2 11.1
1967 13.8 12.7
1963 15.7 12.5
1969 25.1 13.3
Soiirce: , , ;
9.,8
8.,8
8..5
9.,6
8,.1
8..3
11,,1
11,.9
15,.6
14,.4
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an abundance of natural resources. The 1969 Middle East ratios, for ex-
ample, exceed those of the US (8.6), the USSR (8.5), France (4.4), and
England (5.1)
.
Middle East military expenditures are particularly strik-
ing when measured against those in developing regions. For example, com-
pare Table 1 to the 2.2 percent Latin American average, the 2.4 percent
African average, or the 5.0 percent average for all developing nations.^
Military expenditures in the Middle East, by any reading of the num-
bers, are no ordinary expenditures. For the five principals in the Arab-
4
Israel conflict, they represent levels of critical importance.
Admittedly, not all economic problems in the region can be attributed
to its military preoccupation. Nor is the Arab-Israel conflict the
sole determinant of Middle East military expenditures. Sporadic, but
Intense inter-Arab wars and near-wars at times have overshadowed the
conflict between them and Israel. Moreover, the 25 successful Arab revo-
lutions that have occurred during 1948-1971 and at least 45 others that
have been attempted suggest a less than harmonious set of circumstances
within the Arab countries. It would be misleading then to picture a
2lbid.
,
p. 110.
^These averages are for 1964-1967. World Military Expenditures
1969
,
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington,
1969, pp. 12-13.
4
See, for example, The Economic Impact of the Six Day War , Kanovsky
Ellahu, Praeger Publishers, New York 1970, pp. 112-113, 125-136, 332-338
and 427-428.
%erzog, Haim, The Military Situation in the Middle East , Israel
Academic Committee on the Middle East, Jerusalem, 1971, p. 19. See also
Safran, N. , From War to War , Pegasus, New York, 1969, p. 58.
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de-escalation of the Arab-Israel conflict as a Middle East political,
social, or economic panacea. Nevertheless, whatever its derivation.
Middle East military expenditures can be said to have made the traditional
economic problems associated v/ith the development of under-development
regions a matter of secondary importance.
It seems clear enough that economic performance in the Middle East
could have improved during the 1960s if (a) military expenditures were
reduced to levels comparable to those in other developing regions,
(b) the released resources were allocated to the investment sectors,
(c) no absorption problems were encountered, and (d) the differential in
labor productivity between the military and civilian sectors were incon-
sequential. A cursory reading of Table 1 suggests that the magnitude of
improvement would be substantial.
An assessment of this improvement, or, stated differently, an assess-
ment of the military burden in the Middle East can be made by employing
a simple variant of the Harrod-Domar model of the form
^t = Vi^i + '^t + (at-"t))
~~ic
where Y^^ = gross national product in period t,
Tj. r rate of growth of GNP at constant prices in period t
a^. = actual military expenditures as a percent of GNP in
period t
"The analysis here is not unlike the attempt made by Leontief to
assess the effect of a transfer of resource from big-power disarmament to
aid to developing nations. See, Leontief, W. , "Disarmament, Foreign Aid
and Economic Growth" Journal of Peace Research, No. 3-4, 1964, p. 155.
•(. A
- fi.:.\'ri\
.;
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n = normalized military expenditures as a percent of GNP in
period t,
and k = incremental capital output ratio.
The Ililitary Burden 1960-1969:
The results for 1960-1969 are sho\7n in Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c.
Table 2a presents a set ot 1969 GOT estimates based upon alternative
values for the military expenditure GNP ratio (n) and for the incremental
capital output ratio (k) for the five Iliddle East countries.
Israel, for example, under conditions of ri=2.5, k=3, that is, under
conditions approximating those in Latin America and Africa, achieves a
1969 GW of $5,117 million (column 3, table 2a). This compares vrLth $3,874
million that would accrue with n=a, k=3, that is, with military expendi-
tures corresponding to actual 1960-1969 experience. The 8.9 percent annual
rate of growth in the n=a case increases to 12.4 percent under conditions
of n=2.5. In other words, a tailoring of Israel military expenditures to
2.5 percent of GNP v/ould have produced a 1960-1969 annual growth differ-
ential of 3.5 percent. The total wealth forfeited by Israel in the above
comparison is $3,896 million which defines the 1960-1969 military burden
(table 2c, column 1). This burden sums the differences in GITP arising
from the transfer of (a^. - 2.5) GW^ resources from the military sector
to civilian investment for each of the 1960-1969 years.
The military burden diminishes as the alternative values assumed
for n approaches n=a. In the case of n=5.0, that is, in circumstances
approximating the weighted average for all developing nations, and with
k=3, Israel's 1969 GW is $4,790 million, its annual rate of growth is
11.5 percent and the military burden for 1960-1969 is $2,689 million.

Table 2a ^,
Cross National Product for Israe.T, Syri a, E^ypt, Iraq, and Jordan, 1960-1969
(millions of constant 1964 US $ at factor cost)
Israel
Egypt
Syria
Iraq
Jordan
Totals
1960
1795
2850
637
1418
270
6970
k-3
1969
k=4
n--a n=2.5 n-5.0 n=2.5
3874 5117 4790 4779
4094 5158 4801 4S72
1220 1528 1429 1444
2396 2888 2753 2806
551 752 702 695
12135 15443 14475 14596
n=5.0
4571
4618
1373
2663
661
13886
Source: (a) Comparative Data Unit, Economics Departmeiit, International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (December, 1968; (b) the annual
rates of growth for each country (r in the above equation) from
National Accounts of Less Developed Countries, Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, June, 1970
Tab le 2b
CcEipouiid Annua
1
Rate of Gra-^th for Is:
19.6.2.
Syri.aj^.lraq, and Jor(3an,
I960-"
J
(cons uaiiL prices)
k-3 k=4
n-~a r=2.5
12.4
n-5.0
11.5
n=2.5
11.5
-
n=5.0
Israel 8.9 11.0
Egvot 4.1 6.8 6.0 6.1 5.5
Syria 7.5 10.2 9.4 9.5 8.9
Iraq 6.0 8.2 7.7 7.9 7.3
Jordan 8.3 12.1 11.3 11.1 10.5
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Table 2c
Estimates of MiJltarv B Lirden for Isr^fl, E^vpu . Syria, Irag_j_ and Jordan, 1960-
1969
(millions US $)
k-3 k==4
•
n=2..5 n=5.0 n=2.5 n=5.0
Israel 3896 2689 2870 2065
Egypt AlAO 2882 3053 1935
Syria 1065 684 778 504
Iraq 2066 1455 1702 1098
Jordan 810 648 595
8998
451
Total 11977 8358 6053
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The burden, as table 2c shows, is also affected by the value of k.
With n=2.5 and k=4, Israel's military burden is reduced from $3,396
million to $2,870 million.
Corresponding estimates of military burden are made for Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, and Syria. In the n=2.5, h=3 case of Egypt, for example, the
1960-1969 military burden is $4,140 million representing the heaviest
burden of the five countries. The Iraqi burden is $2,066 million, the
Syrian $1,0^^5 million and the Jordanian $810 million. The total military
burden for the five countries is $11,977 million.
The Tlilitary Burden 1970-1980;
Calculations of military burden for 1970-1980 depend upon conjec-
tures of future rates of economic growth and future military expenditure
GIIP ratios. Ililitary burden estimates offered in table 3 below are based
upon the following tX'/o assumptions: (1) the rate of growth for each of the
1970-1980 years is the 1960-1969 weighted average,^ and (2) the 1969
military expenditure GIIP ratios apply for each of the 1970-1980 years. The
'TJhile there is no compelling reason to assume that Iliddle East eco-
nomic performance in the 1970s will match the performance of the preceding
decade, no particular reasons can be advanced to argue a less or a more
attractive performance. The Israeli "Projected Development until 1978"
assumes a per capita growth of 5.1 percent for 1971-1978 which is precisely
the rate for 1960-1969. Kanovsky, op. cit .
,
p. 125.
^The selection of the 1969 ratios rather than, say, an average of the
1960-1969 ratios is based upon the observation that most experts on the
subject believe the 1969 ratios to be the more representative of things
to come. For example, see Ilr. Abraham Agmon, Director General of the
Israel Finance '!inistry commenting in The Jerusalem Post
,
October 13, 1970,
p. 1.
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GNP base used in the calculations is 1969 GNP with n=a, k=3.
In the Israel case of n=2.5, k=3, the 1970-1980 military burden is
$44,960 million. By contrast, this burden represents a more than eleven
fold increase over the 1960-1969 military burden. The dramatic increase
9
is explained by the extraordinary n=25.1 for the entire 1970-1980 period.
T'lhile the Israel burden v/as 30 percent of the total regional burden in
1960-1969, it becomes, by 1970-1980, 59 percent of the regional. The
military burden in Egypt increases to 350 percent, the Iraqi to 310 ner-
cent, the Jordanian to 480 percent and the Syrian to 570 percent of the
1960-1969 burden.
Conclusion
It is clear from the above analysis that the military burden in the
lliddle East for 1960-1969 and 1970-1980 is both substantial and increasing.
The existence of a military burden, of course, is not unique to the Twiddle
East. TJhat is particular, however, is its relative size. A sustained
military expenditure GlIP ratio at three to four times the level of other
developing nations has produced more than a moderate deflection of human
and raterial resources avjay from still underdeveloped civilian sectors.
Although there is perhaps no limit to the number of alternative uses that
can be described in a military-civilian trade-off, it may be of some
interest to note that were the military burden, measured at n=2.5, lc=3.
^The only country irLth a similar n posture is Horth Vietnam, e.g.,
n= 19.7 in 1965, n= 21.1 in 1966, and n= 25.0 in 1967. United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, 0£. cit
,
p. 18.
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Esti.ma tes of Milit a ry Burden for IsltgI
,
E>;yp t, Syria, Iraq^ and Jordan ,
"1970-1980
(millions US $)
k=3 k=4
n=2,5 n=5.0 n-2.5 n-5.0
Israel 44960 39046 32066 27438
Egypt 14456 10967 10511 8012
Syria 6081 4580 4409 3452
Iraq 6417 4259 4786 3072
Jordan 3937 3156 2815 2342
Total 75851 62008 54587 44316
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reasslgned in 1969 as a transfer payment to the 1,395,074 Palestinian
refugeeg^O ^^^ pg^ capita income of the refugees would have increased by
$1,238 or over three times the per capita income in Egypt, Iraq, Syria,
or Jordan.
'•
^Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and
TJorks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East General Assembly,
Official Records: T^/enty-fifth Session, Supplement 13 (A/8013) United
Nations, llevj York, 1970, p. 67.
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